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This article investigates the degree of tolerance to higher inflation
rates in the short run by the presidents of the Brazilian Central Bank
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show the following empirical evidences: i) the mandate of Henrique
Meirelles was less tolerant to higher inflation rates when comparing
with the mandate of Armínio Fraga and ii) the Alexandre Tombini’s ad-
ministration is more tolerant to higher inflation rate in the short run
than Armínio Fraga’s.
Este artigo analisa o grau de tolerância a elevadas taxas de inflação de
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de Taylor via GMM. Em geral, os resultados mostram as seguintes evidên-
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1. INTRODUÇÃO
The economic literature relative to higher inflation rates is very disperse and lacks relevant studies,
despite its undeniable importance. Not much is known about the mechanisms by which higher infla-
tion process occurs. In this context, the purpose of this paper is to investigate on a systematic way
this process in Brazil, comparing the coefficients of elasticity of the monetary authority’s reaction to
changes in the Selic rate for a given increase in the inflation rate.
More specifically, this article aims to assess the degree of tolerance to the inflation rate in the
short run by comparing the performances of the presidents of the Bacen in the period 2001-2012. The
comment below, taken from the minutes of the 156th meeting held on 18 and 19/01/2012, and also
present in several other minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee, inspired this paper.
“The committee also understands that low risks for the underlying inflation in the short run tend
to reduce uncertainties regarding the future behavior of headline inflation, facilitate the assessment of
scenarios by the monetary authority, as well as help the process of coordination of economic agents’
expectations, mainly price setters’. It is additionally noteworthy that low risks for the underlying
inflation in the short run tend to reinforce the effects of monetary policy actions, enabling them to affect
in a more long-lasting manner the dynamics of headline inflation in the future. Although the Copom
recognizes that other actions of macroeconomic policy may influence the price trajectory, it reaffirms
its view that it the responsibility of the monetary policy to remain especially vigilant to guarantee that
pressures detected in shorter horizons do not spread to longer horizons.”
In this context, we use different specifications of the Taylor rule to evaluate this issue. Since the
publication of the monetary policy rule proposed by TAYLOR (1993), several theoretical and empiri-
cal studies have been conducted following his approach. TAYLOR (1993) suggests that the process of
implementation of a monetary policy can be modeled by a feedback rule, which we write as
Rt = β0 + β1(pit−1 − pi∗) + β2y˜t (1)
where β0 = pit−1 + r¯; Rt is the quarter t value of an interest rate instrument; pit−1 is the average
inflation rate over the four quarters prior to t; pi∗ is the target inflation rate; y˜t = yt − y¯t is the
difference between the (logs) real GDP yt and its capacity or natural rate value y¯t and r¯ the real interest
rate of equilibrium. The policy feedback parameters β1 and β2 are positive, such as each of them equals
0.5 in Taylor’s (1993) example. Hence, the interest rate instrument is raised in response to values of
inflation and output that are high relative to their targets.
CLARIDA et al. (1999) proposed a major modification in the rule proposed by TAYLOR (1993) with
the introduction of a smoothing term, an auto-regressive component that captures the relationship
between the interest rate and its lagged values, i.e.,
Rt = β0 + β1Rt−1 + β2(piet+1 − pi∗) + β3y˜et+1 (2)
where the parameter β1 represents the degree of interest rate smoothing. In this sense, the higher the
value of β1, the greater the inertia in the dynamics of the interest rates, which means a higher serial
correlation in the series.
The difference between the above two equations is that the rule of Equation 2 is the type forward-
looking while the Taylor rule (1993) is the type backward-looking (Equation 1). Equation 2 shows that
the interest rate increases in response to an increase in inflation expectations (piet+1) in relation to a tar-
get and an increase in the expected output gap (yet+1) Equation 2 explicitly highlights the importance
of lags in monetary policy, which requires of the Central Bank a prospective behavior.
TAYLOR (1999) presents a collection of articles referring to this literature. His striking findings
relates to the potential response of interest rates to an array of variables, including changes in the rates
of inflation, unemployment, and exchange. He points out that simple policy rules are more robust and
more efficient than complex rules with multiple variables.
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The Brazilian literature is reach. We highlight here a number of studies that estimate rules à la
Taylor. These are ANDRADE and DIVINO (2001), MENDONÇA (2001), FIGUEIREDO and FERREIRA (2002),
MINELLA et al. (2002), FAVERO and GIAVAZZI (2002), MINELLA et al. (2003), SALGADO et al. (2005),
MENDONÇA (2007), MOREIRA et al. (2007), MODENESI (2011) and MOREIRA (2011).
ROMER and ROMER (2002) make an interesting study on the implementation of U.S. monetary policy
to the various mandates of the presidents of the FED based on the evaluation of the minutes of the
Monetary Policy Committee (FOMC). The authors make comments about the FOMC minutes for the
mid- and late 1950s. Based on the analysis of FED records, the authors show that policymakers had
a definite aversion to inflation and were willing to accept significant costs to prevent it from rising to
even moderate levels. They stress that this aversion to inflation was the result of policymaker’s beliefs
that higher inflation could not raise output in the long run, that the level of output that would trigger
increases in inflation was only moderate, and that inflation had large real costs in the medium and long
runs.
Empirical estimates of a forward-looking Taylor rule show that policymakers in the 1950s raised
nominal interest rates more than one-for-one with increases in expected inflation. Furthermore, ROMER
and ROMER (2002) suggest that monetary policy in the 1950s was more similar to policy in the 1980s
and 1990s than to that in the late 1960s and 1970s. The particular specification that ROMER and ROMER
(2002) consider is a forward-looking Taylor rule, base on CLARIDA et al. (2000) where





In this sense our article is motivated by the work of ROMER and ROMER (2002, 2004).1
Our article proceeds as follows. We cover the methodological aspects in Section 2. The empirical
results are presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we present the main conclusions. In Annex 1 we show
further empirical results that support the findings of Section 3 and we define the variables used in the
analysis in Annex 2.
2. METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS
In our empirical work, we use monthly data from 2001:01 to 2012:12. The variables and the notation
used in this article (in parentheses) are as follow. Real GDP (Y ) is computed deflating GDP by the
General Price Index (IGP-DI).2 As a proxy for real output gap (y), we compute the difference between
real GDP and the same series smoothed by the Hodrick-Prescoter filter. If the difference between real
GDP and potential GDP (trend) is positive, the value indicates excess demand. Likewise we compute the
expected output gap (ye). We use the consumer confidence index as a proxy for real expected output.3.
We consider the primary budget surplus/GDP (PBS/GDP) ratio as the relevant fiscal variable.4 Finally we
use the stock of money M1 deflated by IPCA (Consumer Price Index) to represent the demand for money.
All these variables are considered in natural logs.
The inflation rate (pi) is measured by the percentage variation of IPCA. This is the Brazilian consumer
price index used by the Brazilian Central Bank to target inflation. We use the percentage variation of
expected Brazilian consumer price index as a proxy for expected inflation (pie). The nominal interest
1Recently, ROMER and ROMER (2013) conjecture based on the records of the US monetary policies in the 1930s, 1970s, and 2007-
2012, that overly pessimistic views about the power of the monetary policy have been a critical source of failures of monetary
policies over the past century. This paper has useful information to all who are interested in Federal Reserve history, but also
to those seeking an interesting perspective on recent monetary policy.
2We follow the same procedure of MOREIRA and SOARES (2012) and ARAÚJO and DONHA (2011).
3The Central Bank uses this index in the analysis of the minutes of COPOM as indicative of consumer optimism that is a proxy
for demand variation. Consumers more optimistic tend to demand more goods and services.
4The Central Bank also uses this fiscal indicator in the analysis of the minutes of COPOM.
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rate (R) is the SELIC interest rate. The SELIC rate is the benchmark interest rate, a base rate influencing
the level of all other interest rates in the Brazilian economy.
The percentage variation of effective real exchange index (e) is a proxy for the real exchange rate.
The real interest rate (r) is the SELIC base interest rate minus the expected inflation. The deviation
between inflation rate and the expected inflation rate (pi − pie) is taken into account to determine the
SELIC base interest rate. The percentage variation of the nominal exchange index (η) is a proxy for the
nominal exchange rate. All these variables are in percentage variation. Table 6 in the Annex 2 shows
the description of aggregate variables.
We use dummies variables (D) to identify the presidents of the Brazilian Central Bank. In this sense,
DAF = 1 if the president is Armínio Fraga Neto (2001:01 to 2002:12), otherwise DAF = 0; DHM = 1 if
the president is Henrique de Campos Meirelles (2003:01 to 2010:12), otherwise DHM = 0 and DAT = 1
if the president is Alexandre Tombini (2011:01 to 2012:12), otherwise DAT = 0.5
The time-series models are presented in detail in Section 3. We use simultaneous equation mod-
els and generalized method of moments (GMM) with instrumental variables. It should be noted that
use of the GMM is appropriate when the regressors and the error term are correlated, in which case
instrumental variables should be used which are not correlated with the residuals, but are correlated
with the regressors. We use over-identifying restrictions and the J -statistic to assess model fitting. The
null-hypothesis is that the over-identification constraints are satisfied. The instruments are also used
to resolve endogeneity problems.
Furthermore, when the variables are not stationary specific problems are known to arise in conven-
tional inference procedures based on ordinary last squares (OLS) regressions. JOHNSTON and DINARDO
(p. 317 1997) stress the importance of knowing whether similar problems occur in the context of two-
stage least squares regressions.
HSIAO (1997b,a) analyse this problem and conclude that inference with two-stage last square es-
timators using instrumental variables remains valid, even in the case of non-stationary or non-co-
integrated series. In that context, Hsiao’s conclusions also hold when GMM is applied.
The GMM method applied to estimate the parameters present in the three simultaneous systems
below, produces the results shown in the the next sections. For the the first system we estimate the IS
Curve (Equation 4) as
yt = β0 + β1yt−j + β2yet−j + β3rt−j + β4(psb/gdp)t−j + β5et−j + ut (4)
where j = 0, 1, 2, 3... months.
The Taylor rule (Equation 5) is





+ β7DAT + β8(pit−j − piet−j) + νt (5)
In this equation notice the interactions between the expected inflation rate and the dummies for the
period of Henrique Meirelles (piet
∗DHM) and for the period of Alexandre Tombini (piet
∗DAT ) as well
as the effect of the expected inflation rate (piet ) on the nominal interest rate (SELIC). The corresponding
parameters allow the comparison of the inflation aversion revealed by the Henrique Meirelles and by
the Alexandre Tombini administrations with the Armínio Fraga’s administration.
For the second system the Phillips curve6 is
5Arminio Fraga was president of the Central Banks since April/1999. However, the series about expected inflation is available
only since 2001. In this context, our empirical series begin just in 2001.
6SACHSIDA and MENDONÇA (2009), SCHETTINI et al. (2012), SACHSIDA et al. (2011), MENDONCA et al. (2012), SACHSIDA et al.
(2009) estimate several different specifications of the Phillips to the Brazilian economy.
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pit = β0 + β1pit−j + β2piet−j + β3yt−j + β4ηt−j + ut (6)
where j = 0, 1, 2, 3 · · · months, and the Taylor rule (Equation 7) is





+ β7DHM + β8(pit−j − piet−j) + β9 + νt (7)
The third system shows the Taylor rule as Equation 87





+ β7DHM + β8(pit−j − piet−j) + β9Rt−j + νt (8)
where j = 0, 1, 2, 3 · · · months, and the demand for money is given by equation 9 as follows
(M1/P )t = β0 + β1Rt−j + β2Yt−j + νt (9)
In the Annex 1 we estimate two more systems to check the consistency of the empirical results.8 In
total we estimate five different systems to address the objective of this paper.
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section presents the empirical results resulting from simultaneous equation models estimated
via generalized method of moments (GMM) with instrumental variables. Notice that for each system
the specification of the Taylor’s rule is different.
3.1. IS curve and a Taylor rule
The estimation of the IS curve and of the Taylor rule are in Table 1. The results shown in Model 1
indicate that all variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. All coefficients have the expected
signs. The value of the J -statistic at 0.2029, with a p-value of 0.90, does not indicate evidence to reject
the model specification.
The empirical results presented in Model 1 show that for every 1% increase in Output Gap (yt−1)
and in the Consumer Confidence Index (proxy to expected output gap, yet−1) lagged by one month,
the current Output Gap rises by 0.7671% and 0.0284% respectively, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the
positive parameter for the change in the real exchange rate (et) implies domestic currency depreciation.
Although the real exchange rate show a positive association with the Output Gap as expected, the
estimated coefficient value is near zero.
The Output Gap is negatively affected by the monetary and fiscal policies with a lag of three months.
In this sense, a 1% quarterly decrease in the real interest rate (rt−3) and in the primary surplus/GDP
ratio (psb/gdp)t−3 will increase the Output Gap by 0.5473% and 0.3830% respectively, ceteris paribus.
However, we can analyze the indirect effects of real interest rate and of primary surplus/GDP ratio on
nominal interest rate (Rt), considering the results presented in Model 2. In this context, given that
a 1% increase in output gap increases nominal interest rate by 0.8778%, then the final effect of a 1%
7Notice that the specifications of the Taylor rule (Equations 5, 7, and 8) follow CLARIDA et al. (2000) and ROMER and ROMER
(2002). In this sense, they are similar, but not identical, to the specifications given in Equation 3 since the nominal interest rate
responds to the expected inflation rate.
8The specifications of the Taylor rule presented in the annexes follow TAYLOR (1993). In this sense, they are similar, but not
identical, to the specification given in Equation 1.
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decrease in the real interest rate and in the primary surplus/GDP ratio will cause a positive impact of
0.4804% and 0.3362% quarterly decrease in the SELIC (Rt) respectively, ceteris paribus.
We use three variables to study to compare the aversion to inflation revealed by Henrique Meirelles’
administration and by the Alexandre Tombini’s administration with relation to Armínio Fraga’s admin-
istration. These are interaction between the expected inflation rate and dummies for the period of
Henrique Meirelles (piet *DHM) and for the period of Alexandre Tombini (pi
e
t *DAT) and the effect of the
expected inflation rate (piet ) on the nominal interest rate (SELIC). The empirical results of the Taylor rule
are shown in Model 2 where all estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 5% level, except the
coefficients of the constant term, DHM and piet
∗DHM .
Table 1: Simultaneous Equations Models
Estimation Method: GMM (Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth, Fixed)
Model 1: IS curve Model 2: Taylor rule
Variables Coefficient (S.E.) Variables Coefficient (S.E.)
Constant 0.0124 (0.0012) * Constant 0.0310 (0.0206)
yt−1 0.7671 (0.0211) * Rt−1 0.9110 (0.0044) *
yet−1 0.0284 (0.0107) * pi
e
t 0.1550 (0.0334) *
rt−3 -0.5473 (0.1115) * yt 0.8778 (0.0355) *
(psb/gdp)t−3 -0.3830 (0.0175) * piet
∗DHM 0.0163 (0.0325)
et 5.07E-06 (1.13E-0.6) * piet
∗DAT -0.2385 (0.0458) *
DHM -0.0155 (0.0206) **
DAT 0.0738 (0.0234) *
(pit − piet ) 0.0133 (0.0048) *
R2 44.40% R2 88.90%
J -statistic 0.2029 J -statistic 0.2029
Instruments: y(−4 to −9); ye(−4 to −9); r(−4 to −9);
psb/gdp(−4 to −9); e(−4 to −9); R(−4 to −9); pie(−4 to −9);
pi − pie(−4 to −9); EMBI (−4 to −9), C.
Source: Prepared by authors. Note : * p-value ≤ 0.01; ** p-value ≤ 0.05; *** p-value ≤ 0.10;
(SE) = Standard Error.
The estimated coefficient of the lagged monthly interest rate (Rt−1) is 0.911 and it shows an in-
ertial effect of the interest rate. As expected, the signs of the estimated coefficients of piet and yt are
positive with values of 0.1550 and 0.8778 respectively. The deviation between inflation rate and ex-
pected inflation rate (pi − pie) presents an estimated coefficient positive value of 0.0133. It shows that
an increase of 1% in this deviation will increase the SELIC by 0.0133%. This result means that if the
economics agents estimate a expected inflation rate lower than the actual inflation rate systematically,
the Central Bank will incorporate in their Taylor rule this deviation and will respond to this error level
with an increase in the nominal interest rate.
As the estimated coefficient of dummy variable “DHM” is not statistically different of zero, then the
intercept associated with the Henrique Meirelles’ administration is not statistically different from the
Armínio Fraga’s. The interaction variable “piet
∗DHM” is not statistically different from the Armínio
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Fraga’s administration as well. These results show that the aversion to inflation rate in the short run
of both administrations is similar.
On the other hand, the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable “DAT” is statistically different
from the Armínio Fraga’s administration effect and the interaction variable “piet
∗DAT ” is also statisti-
cally different from the Armínio Fraga’s administration. The estimated coefficient value of the interac-
tion variable “piet
∗DAT ” is−0.2385. Therefore, the estimated coefficient value that shows the aversion
to inflation rate in the short run regarding to Alexandre Tombini’s administration is (0.1550− 0.2385)
−0.0835. This result shows that the Alexandre Tombini’s administration is more tolerant to the short
run inflation rate than Armínio Fraga’s.
3.2. Phillips curve and a Taylor rule
The estimation of the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule are shown in Table 2. The results of Model 3
indicate that all variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. All coefficients have the expected
signs. The value of the J -statistic at 0.2114, with a p-value of 0.95, and does not provide evidence to
reject the model specification.
The empirical results shown in Model 3 show that the elasticities obtained by GMM for inflation rate
lagged by one month (pit−1), expected inflation rate (piet ), output gap (yt) and the nominal exchange
rate (ηt) are 0.5136, 0.7433, 0.8249 and 0.0067 respectively.
Similarly, for the Taylor rule, the variables of concern are the interactions with the dummies for the
period of Henrique Meirelles (piet
∗DHM) and for the period of Alexandre Tombini (piet
∗DAT ) and the
effect of the expected inflation rate (piet ) on the nominal interest rate (SELIC). The empirical results of
the Taylor rule are presented in Model 4 and all coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level,
except the coefficients of the constant term, DHMand (pit−1 − piet−1). The estimated coefficient of
(piet
∗DHM) is marginally significant at the 6% level.
The estimated coefficient of the lagged monthly interest rate (Rt−1) is 0.9062 and it shows an
inertial effect of the interest rate. As expected, the signs of estimated coefficients of piet and yt are
positive with values of 0.1055 and 1.0435 respectively. Now, the estimated coefficient of the output
gap is greater than one, while in Model 2 the estimated coefficient of this same variable is lower than
one.
The indirect impact of the explanatory variables of the Phillips Curve on the Taylor rule occurs via
pit−1 and is positive, since estimated coefficient pit−1 is 0.0556. We observe that the real (IS curve) and
the nominal (Phillips curve) exchange rates have low elasticities.
Comparing the results of the performance of the presidents of the Central Bank, we can see that
there are differences. As the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable “DHM ′′ is not statisti-
cally different of zero, we conclude that the intercept for the Henrique Meirelles’ administration is
not statistically different from the Armínio Fraga’s administration. However, the interaction variable
“piet
∗DHM” is marginally significant at 6% level. This result shows that the aversion to the inflation
rate in the short run of Henrique Meirelles is higher than that of the Armínio Fraga’s administration.
The estimated coefficient value of the interaction variable “piet
∗DHM” is 0.0329. Therefore, the esti-
mated coefficient value that shows the aversion to inflation rate in the short run regarding to Henrique
Meirelles’s administration is (0.1055 + 0.0329) 0.1384. This result shows that the Henrique Meirelles’
administration is less tolerant to the short run inflation rate that of Armínio Fraga’s.
The results regarding to performance comparisons between the Armínio Fraga and Alexandre Tombini
administration does not indicate change. The estimated coefficients of the dummy variable “DAT ”
and the interaction variable “piet
∗DAT ” are statistically different from zero. The estimated coefficient
value of interactive variable piet
∗DAT is −0.2065. Hence, the estimated coefficient value that shows
the aversion to inflation rate in the short run regarding to the Alexandre Tombini’s administration is
(0.1055−0.2065)−0.1010. This result also shows that the Alexandre Tombini’s administration is more
tolerant to the short run inflation rate than Armínio Fraga’s.
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Table 2: Simultaneous Equations Models.
Estimation Method: GMM (Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth, Fixed)
Model 3: Phillips curve Model 4: Taylor rule
Variables Coefficient (S.E.) Variables Coefficient (S.E.)
Constant pit−1
-0.0915 (0.0075) * 0.0556 (0.0052) *
pit−1 Rt−1




0.7436 (0.0153) * 0.1055 (0.0159) *
yt yt

















R2 64.33% R2 89.08%
J -statistic 0.2114 J -statistic 0.2114
Instruments: y(−4 to −9); ye(−4to− 9); r(−4 to −9);
psb/gdp(−4 to −9); e(−4 to −9); R(−4 to −9); pie(−4 to −9);
pi − pie(−4 to −9); EMBI (−4 to −9), η(−4 to −9), C.
Source: Prepared by authors. Note : * p-value ≤ 0.01; ** p-value ≤ 0.05; *** p-value ≤ 0.10;
(SE) = Standard Error.
RBE Rio de Janeiro v. 67 n. 4 / p. 513–528 Out-Dez 2013
521
An Evaluation of the Tolerant to Higher Inflation Rate in the Short Run
by the Brazilian Central Bank in the Period 2001-2012
3.3. Taylor rule and demand for money
Estimation of the Taylor rule and the demand for money are in Table 3. The results shown in Model
5 indicate that all variables are statistically significant at the 1%level. The value of the J -statistic at
0.2115, with a p-value of 0.99, and does not provide evidence to reject the model specification.
The estimated coefficient of the lagged monthly interest rate (Rt−1) is 0.4291 and and of the two
lagged (Rt−2) is 0.4972. These results show inertial effect of the interest rate in both lags. Notice
that this specification of Taylor rule is different from the ones presented in Models 2 and 4. Here we
introduced Rt−2 in the equation. The statiscal inference does not change. The Alexandre Tombini’s
administration is more tolerant to the inflation rate in the short run that Armínio Fraga’s. The signs of
the estimated coefficients of piet and yt are positive with values of 0.2212 and 0.7846 respectively. The
deviation between the inflation rate and the expected inflation rate (pi − pie) has a positive value of
0.0559.
The estimated coefficients of the dummies variable “DHM” and “DAT ” are positive and they are
statistically different of zero and indicate that the intercepts of both administrations are different from
Armínio Fraga’s. The interaction variables “piet
∗DHM” and “piet
∗DAT ” are also statistically different
from the Armínio Fraga’s administration as well. These results show that the three administrations
are different, with different intercepts and different slopes. In those aspects, the results are different
from Models 2 and 4. However, as shown below, at least one aspect presented in this subsection does
not change: the Alexandre Tombini administration is more tolerant to the short run inflation rate than
Armínio Fraga’s. The estimated coefficient of the interaction variable “piet
∗DAT ” is −0.3740. Hence,
the estimated coefficient value that shows the aversion to the inflation rate in the short run regarding
Alexandre Tombini’s administration is (0.2212 − 0.3740) −0.1528. This result also shows that the
Alexandre Tombini’s administration is more tolerant to the inflation rate in the short run than Armínio
Fraga’s.
The estimated coefficient of the interaction variable “piet
∗DHM” is −0.0401. Hence, the esti-
mated coefficient that shows the aversion to the inflation rate in the short run regarding the Henrique
Meirelles’s administration is (0.2212 − 0.0401) 0.1811. This result shows that the Henrique Meirelles
administration is less tolerant to the inflation rate in the short run than Armínio Fraga’s.
The results shown in Model 6 indicate that all variables are statistically significant at the 1% level.
All coefficients have the expected signs. The results show that a decrease of 1% in the nominal interest
rate (Rt) and an increase of 1% in the real output (Yt) will increase the demand for money by 0.1980%
and for 1.1360% respectively,9 ceteris paribus. In summary, the empirical results presented in this
subsection show that, generally, the Henrique Meirelles’s administration is less tolerant to the short
run inflation rate than Armínio Fraga’s. The Alexandre Tombini’s administration is more tolerant to the
inflation rate in the short run than Armínio Fraga’s.
We consider in the Annex 1 alternative specifications for the Taylor’s rule, where the nominal inter-
est rate and the deviation between the SELIC and this same series smoothed by the Hodrick-Prescoter
filter reacts to the difference between the actual inflation rate and the target of inflation rate. The
statistical results are consistent with previous formulations.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigate how tolerant are the administrations of the presidents of the Central Bank
of Brazil from 2001 to 2012. Based on monthly data, we found empirical evidence that the Henrique
Meirelles’s administration is less tolerant to the short run inflation rate than Armínio Fraga’s in the
9If we introduce the term (M1/P)t-1 in the right side of the demand for money equation system of the Model 6, the general
results do not change in terms of statistical significance, signs of estimated coefficients and in terms of elasticities higher or
lower than 1. The income elasticity in the demand for money equation decreases from 1.1360 to 0.4008.
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Table 3: Simultaneous Equations Models
Estimation Method: GMM (Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth, Fixed)
Model 5: Taylor rule Model 6: Demand for money
Variables Coefficient (S.E.) Variables Coefficient (S.E.)
Constant Constant
-0.0351 (0.0076) * -1.8722 (0.0544) *
Rt−1 Rt
0.4291 (0.0048) * -0.1980 (0.0015) *
piet Yt

















R2 91.88% R2 88.02
J -statistic 0.2115 J -statistic 0.2159
Instruments: y(−4 to −9); ye(−4 to −9); r(−4 to −9);
psb/gdp(−4 to −9); e(−4 to −9); R(−4 to −9); pie(−4 to −9);
pi − pie(−4 to −9); EMBI (−4 to −9), M1/P (−4 to −9), c.
Source: Prepared by authors. Note : * p-value ≤ 0.01; ** p-value ≤ 0.05; *** p-value ≤ 0.10;
(SE) = Standard Error.
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last two year of his administration. On the other hand, Alexandre Tombini in the first two years of his
administration is more tolerant to the inflation rate in the short run than Armínio Fraga in the last two
years of his administration.
We must take into account that Fraga introduced the inflation target regime in a context of high
instability due to the recent currency crises at the end of the 1990 decade and the instability generated
by the federal election of 2002. It should be expected that the administration of the Brazilian Central
Bank would be getting better through time in terms of performance due to the learning by doing
process. With more experience and more know-how, it should be expected that an independent Central
Bank would achieve a better performance or at least do not get worse after successive mandates.
Returning to ROMER and ROMER (2013) it is important to emphasize their conclusion that being
a good central banker appears to require a balance between humility and arrogance. They argue that
hubris can induce central bankers to do great harm. A belief that monetary policy can achieve stable
low inflation together with below-normal unemployment can lead to the pursuit of reckless policies
that do considerable damage.
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A. ANNEX 1: ADITIONAL EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We show estimation of an IS curve and of a Taylor rule in Table 4. The results shown in Model 7 are
similar to results presented in Model 1. All variables are statistically significant at the 1% level and also
present the expected signs. The value of the J -statistic at 0.2101, with a p-value of 0.85, and does not
provide evidence to reject the model specification.
The specification of the Taylor rule presented in the Model 8 is different of the Taylor rule presented
in Models 2, 4 and 5. Now, the reaction function of the Central Bank (Taylor rule) shows the nominal
interest rate (SELIC) reacting to the difference between the actual inflation rate (pit) and the target of
inflation rate (pi∗t ), i.e., (pit−pi∗t ), instead of reacting just to the expected inflation rate (piet ) as presented
in Models 2, 4 and 5.10
Table A-1: Simultaneous Equations Models
Estimation Method: GMM (Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth, Fixed)
Model 7: IS curve Model 8: Taylor rule
Variables Coefficient (S.E.) Variables Coefficient (S.E.)
Constant 0.0127 (0.0016) * Rt−1 0.4784 (0.0151) *
yt−1 0.7678 (0.0163) * pit − pi∗t 0.0513 (0.0109) *
yet−1 0.0307 (0.0094) * yt 0.7457 (0.0438)
rt−3 -0.5640 (0.1454) * (pit − pi∗t )∗DHM 0.0273 (0.0110) **
(psb/gdp)t−3 -0.3840 (0.0215) * (pit − pi∗t )∗DAT -0.2549 (0.0317) *
et 5.27E-06 (1.68E-06) * DAT 0.1473 (0.0148) *
DHM 0.0529 (0.0155) *
pit−1 − piet−1 0.0926 (0.0056) *
Rt−2 0.5014 (0.0161) *
Constant -0.0666 (0.0182) *
R2 44.33% R2 90.88%
J -statistic 0.201 J -statistic 0.2101
Instruments: y(−4 to −9); ye(−4 to −9); r(−4 to −9);
psb/gdp(−4 to −9); e(−4 to −9); R(−4 to −9); pie(−4 to −9);
pi − pie(−4 to −9); EMBI (−4 to −9), C.
Source: Prepared by authors. Note : * p-value ≤ 0.01; ** p-value ≤ 0.05; *** p-value ≤ 0.10;
(SE) = Standard Error
We analyze the impact of variables of interest (pit − pi∗t ), (pit − pi∗t )∗DHM and (pit − pi∗t )∗DAT on
the nominal interest rate (SELIC) based on Model 8. The statistical results show that all the estimated
coefficients significant at 5% level. The estimated coefficient value of the interaction variable (pit −
pi∗t )
∗DAT is −0.2549. Given that the value of estimated coefficient of (pit − pi∗t ) is 0.0513, then the
estimated coefficient value that shows the aversion to the inflation rate in the short run regarding to
Alexandre Tombini’s administration is (0.0513 − 0.2549) −0.2036. This result also shows that the
Alexandre Tombini’s administration is more tolerant to the inflation rate in the short run than the
Armínio Fraga’s.




RBE Rio de Janeiro v. 67 n. 4 / p. 513–528 Out-Dez 2013
526
Tito Belchior Silva Moreira, Geraldo da Silva e Souza and Roberto Ellery Jr
In the same context, the estimated coefficient value of the interaction variable (pit − pi∗t )∗DHM
is 0.0273. Hence, the estimated coefficient value that shows that the aversion to the inflation rate in
the short run regarding to Henrique Meirelles administration is (0.0513 + 0.0273) 0.0786. This result
shows that the Henrique Meirelles’s administration is less tolerant to the inflation rate in the short run
the Armínio Fraga’s.
This section also presents empirical data based on simultaneous equation models via generalized
method of moments (GMM) with instrumental variables. The estimation of an IS curve and another
different specification of the Taylor rule is in Table 5. The results shown in Model 9 are similar to
the results presented Model 7. All variables are statistically significant at the 1% level and show the
expected signs. The value of the J -statistic at 0.2099, with a p-value of 0.85, does not provide evidence
to reject the model specification.
Table A-2: Simultaneous Equations Models.
Estimation Method: GMM (Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth, Fixed)
Model 7: IS curve Model 8: Taylor rule
Variables Coefficient (S.E.) Variables Coefficient (S.E.)
Constant 0.0126 (0.0016) * R˜t−1 0.4455 (0.0146) *
yt−1 0.7675 (0.0159) * (pit − pi∗t ) 0.0486 (0.0130) *
yet−1 0.0301 (0.0093) * yt 0.7059 (0.0423) *
rt−3 -0.5647 (0.1409) * (pit − pi∗t )∗DHM 0.0171 (0.0123)
(psb/gdp)t−3 -0.3829 (0.0199) * (pit − pi∗t )∗DAT -0.2645 (0.0309) *
et 5.46E-06 (1.78E-06) * DAT 0.1846 (0.0139) *
DHM 0.0849 (0.0169) *
pit−1 − piet−1 0.0901 (0.0062) *
R˜t−2 0.481845 (0.0159) *
Constant -0.1062 (0.0160) *
R2 44.35% R2 57.65%
J -statistic 0.2099 J -statistic 0.2099
Instruments: y(−4 to −9); ye(−4 to −9); r(−4 to −9);
psb/gdp(−4 to −9); e(−4 to −9); R(−4 to −9); pie(−4 to −9);
pi − pie(−4 to −9); EMBI (−4 to −9), C.
Source: Prepared by authors. Note : * p-value ≤ 0.01; ** p-value ≤ 0.05; *** p-value ≤ 0.10;
(SE) = Standard Error
The specification of the Taylor rule presented in the Model 10 is similar to the rule presented in the
Model 8. There is just one difference. Now, the variable for the reaction function of Central Bank is
not the nominal interest rate (SELIC), but the deviation between the SELIC (Rt) and this same series
smoothed by the Hodrick-Prescoter filter, (Rnt ) , that is R˜t = (Rt − Rnt ). We see that (R˜t) is a proxy
for the nominal interest rate gap. If is positive, the authority monetary implements a contractionary
monetary policy; otherwise, the Central Bank implements an expansionary monetary policy. We follow
MOREIRA and SOARES (2012).
The empirical results of the Taylor rule presented in Model 10 show that all the estimated coeffi-
cients are statistically significant at the 5% level, except the coefficient of (pit − pi∗t ). As the interaction
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variable is not statistically different from the Armínio Fraga’s administration, this result indicates that
the aversion to inflation in the short run for each administration is similar. The estimated coefficient
value of the interaction variable is −0.2645. Given that the value of the estimated coefficient of is
0.0486, it follows that the estimated coefficient value that shows the aversion to the inflation rate in
the short run regarding the Alexandre Tombini’s administration is (0.0486 − 0.2645) −0.2159. Once
again, this result shows that the Alexandre Tombini’s administration is more tolerant to the inflation
rate in the short run than Armínio Fraga’s.
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B. ANNEX 2: DATA DESCRIPTION
Table B-3: Description of aggregate variables
Variables Acronym Description of variable Unit of measurement Source
General Price Index IGP-DI General Price Index - Domestic
Supply
Index IPEA
GDP GDP GDP at market prices R$ million IPEA
Real GDP Y GDP at market prices deflated
by general prices index - do-
mestic supply (IGP-DI)
R$ million IPEA
Consumer Confidence Index ye Expectations Index (IEC) mea-
sures the rate of consumer con-
fidence in the Metropolitan Re-
gion of São Paulo
Index Federação do Comércio do Es-
tado de São Paulo
Primary Budget Surplus PBS NFSP - Federal Government and
Central Bank - primary - with-
out currency devaluation - R$
(million)
R$ million IPEA
Extended Consumer Price Index IPCA The Broad Consumer Price In-
dex (IPCA) reported by the Na-
tional Bureau of Geography and
Statistics (IBGE) was chosen for
the purpose of gauging infla-
tion targets
Index BCB
Inflation rate pi Inflation rate as measured by
the Extended Consumer Price
Index
Percentages BCB
Expected Inflation Rate pie Expected rate of inflation based
on the IPCA earlier this month
to the end of the month. Me-
dian expectations of the Top 5 -
Short term
Percentages BCB
Target Inflation rate pi∗ The Brazilian Central Bank sets
inflation targets for each year
based on the IPCA
Percentages BCB
Nominal Interest Rate R Basic interest rate implemented
through the Special Settlement
and Custody System (SELIC)
Percentages BCB
Effective real exchange index e Exchange rate - real effective -
INPC - exports - index (average
2005 = 100)
Index IPEA
Nominal Interest Rate η R$/US$ - commercial - average
price
Percentages IPEA
JPMPBRA - JPM EMBI+ BRAZIL -
TOT RETURN IND
EMBI The Emerging Markets Bond In-
dex Plus (EMBI+) tracks total
returns for traded external debt
instruments (external meaning
foreign currency denominated
fixed income) in the emerging
markets
Index Morgan Markets
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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